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PROBLEMS FOR A COMPLETE NATURALISM 
 
Kevin Schilbrack I University of Chicago Divinity School 
 
I 
 
American naturalism has had an on-again, off-again relationship with 
metaphysics. 1 Some naturalists have agreed with John Dewey who saw his 
approach as not only compatible with but also inseparable from "a detection 
and description of the generic traits of existence."2 Others, however, see 
naturalism and metaphysics as inherently opposed. Such philosophers 
attempt to give a complete account of reality without ever appealing to 
metaphysical claims, a "complete naturalism" in which all claims about the 
world are as contingent as those of the sciences. The ways in which one 
might argue for such a position are various, but in my opinion none succeeds. 
The goal of this essay then is to consider the three basic strategies for a 
complete or anti-metaphysical naturalism, and to indicate the problems 
involved in each. 
Much turns, of course, on one's definition of metaphysics. If one 
defines metaphysics as the inquiry into necessary existential claims, it seems 
that there are three possible strategies by which one might attempt to do 
without it. First, one might argue that there are no necessary statements at all. 
Second, one might distinguish between existential and nonexistential claims 
and predicate necessity only of the latter. Third, one might try not to argue 
against metaphysics, but rather permanently to avoid it by changing the 
subject whenever metaphysical questions are brought up. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 For an excellent review of the evolution of American naturalism and a survey of the 
".kaleidoscopic" reference of the term, see Anyur Karimsky, "American Naturalism from a 
Non-American Perspective," Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 28:4 (Fall 1992), 
645-65. 
2 John Dewey, Experience and Nature (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1929), 51. 
Several recent interpreters of Dewey have argued against the possibility of separating some 
part of Deweys philosophy fromhis metaphysics. See for example Thomas Alexander, John 
Dewey's Theory of Art, Experience, and Nature: The Horizons of Feeling (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1987), chap. 3; Raymond D. Boisvert, Dewey's Metaphysics 
(New York: Fordham University Press, 1988); and the Symposium on Deweys Metaphysics 
in the Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 28:2 (Spring 1992): 161-216. 

  
 
 
 
The first strategy for a complete naturalism rejects all necessary claims. On 
this view, every claim is contingent, and any claim can be meaningfully 
denied. The most thoroughgoing and influential position of this sort is that of 
W. V. 0. Quine. Quine argues in "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" 3 that the idea 
of analytic statements (which for Quine includes logically necessary 
statements)4 is ill-founded and ought to be abandoned. In the critical first 
sections of the essay, Quine argues that explanations of analyticity (in terms 
of cognitive synonymy, interchangeability salva veritate, semantical rules, 
and so on) appeal to notions that are no more clear than or that presuppose the 
notion of analyticity. But, as has been widely noted, that the notion of 
analyticity cannot be defined without appealing to terms that presuppose it 
does not invalidate the notion: it may simply be  the case that analyticity is 
part of a family of concepts which imply each other.5 Moreover, as 
Franklin Gamwell points out, those who argue for a metaphysical position do 
not deny 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 W. V. Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," From a Logical Point of View, 2nd ed, rev. 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,  1980), 20-46. 
4 Although Quine's explicit attack is on the notion of analytic statements, which he defines as 
statements ''true by virtue of meanings and independently of facts" (21), he certainly means 
his criticisms to apply to necessary or a priori statements as well, that is, statements "true in 
all possible worlds," "statements Whose denials are self-contradictory" (20) or "a limiting 
kind of statement which is vacuously confirmed, ipso facto, come what may'' (41). There 
is certainly a difference between the two, however -a difference which can be brought out 
by noting that analytic statements such as "a bachelor is an unmarried man" can be 
confirmed only in those possible worlds with humans in them, not "come what may." 
Hilary Putnam suggests di.at Quine confuses analytic tru1hs widi. the narrower field of a priori 
truths, because he uncritically inherits their positivist identification. See Putnam,"'Two 
Dogmas' Revisited," Realism and Reason: Philosophical Papers, Vol. 3 (Cambridge: 
University Press, 1983), 92. 
5 See, for example, Benson Mates, "Analytic Sentences," Philosophical Review 60:4 
(October 1951), 528-30; H P. Grice and P. F. Strawson, "In Defense of a Dogma," 
Philosophical Review 65:2 (April 1956), 148; or Hilary Putnam, "Two Dogmas' Revisited," 
88. Grice and Strawson compare analyticity in this respect to this family of notions that 
includes "morally wrong," ''blamewor1hy," "breach of moral rules," or the family that 
includes "fact," "denial," "statement," "true," and "false." 
 
 
 
 
but insist that there are concepts presupposed by all others.6 In this respect, 
Quine's discussion may serve to clarify the notion of analyticity rather then 
overthrow it. In the constructive last section of this essay, however, Quine 
argues that one can give a thoroughgoing account of knowledge without 
appealing to the idea of necessary truths. It is to this account and its 
credibility that I now tum. 
Quine argues persuasively that any single belief depends upon many 
others. Even a simple descriptive statement such as "Right now, I am looking 
at a boat" depends on a nest of other beliefs which remain implicit, beliefs that 
range from mundane knowledge about sails and water to more abstract bits 
involving theories of time or logic. Thus, to borrow one of Quine's metaphors, 
all of one's beliefs form an interrelated web. 
 
The totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs, from 
the most casual matters of geography and history to 
the profoundest laws of atomic physics or even of 
pure mathematics and logic, is a man-made fabric which 
impinges on experience only along the edges. Or, to change 
the figure, total science is like a field of force whose 
boundary conditions are experience.7 
 
As Quine's images also suggest, he believes that all statements are of 
a single kind. The only difference between one's beliefs about "casual matters" 
and those about "the profoundest laws" is their degree of proximity to their 
experiential conditions. Quine argues for this "monistic" 8 position on the 
grounds that, in a scientific theory, when predictions fail, the theory fails as 
a whole. To repair it, one may revise the errant predictions, or one may revise 
the definitions and laws that led to them. That is, although the laws and 
definitions are apparently necessarily true, true by virtue of the meanings of 
the terms that compose them, they too can be revised to account for 
 
 
 
 
6    Franklin 1Gamwell, The Divine  Good: Modern Moral  Theory and the Necessity  of God 
(San Francisco: HarperCollins,  1991), 96, fn. 4. 
7   Quine, "Two Dogmas," 42. 
8   Quine calls his position "methodological monism" in "Five Milestones of Empiricism," 
Theories and Things (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,  1981), 71-72. 
  
 
 
"recalcitrant experience. "9 Quine then takes a more radical step. He argues 
that revisability extends throughout the theory, not only to its definitions but 
to the principles of logic and mathematics used in it as well. Insofar as logic 
and mathematics are applied in the natural sciences, they share its contingent 
status. "Revision of the logical law of the excluded middle has been proposed 
as a means of  simplifying quantum mechanics; and what difference is there in 
principle between such a shift and the shift whereby Kepler superseded 
Ptolemy, or Einstein Newton, or Darwin Aristotle?" 10 
There is of course a difference between the laws of physics, which are 
expressly created to account for experience, and logical principles. Quine 
accounts for this difference by saying that logical principles are so central to 
one's field of knowledge that to revise them would cause enormous violence 
to the rest of one’s system. Under ordinary conditions, it will be preferable to 
revise any other belief, and the knower follows a "maxim of minimum 
mutilation." Despite this difference in the degree of willingness to revise, 
however, there is no qualitative difference, and even logical principles are 
ultimately confirmed or infirmed by experience. Consequently, the distinction 
between contingent and necessary statements breaks down. 
 
[I]t becomes folly to seek a boundary between synthetic 
statements, which hold contingently on experience, and 
analytic statements, which hold come what may. Any 
statement can be held true come what may, if we make 
drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in the system.... 
Conversely, by the same token, no statement is immune to 
 
 
 
9 For an example of revising the law that momentum is proportional to velocity, see W. V. 
Quine, "Necessary Truth," The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays, rev. and enl. ed 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976). 
10 Quine, "Two Dogmas," 43. Some of Quine's commentators rightly complain that, other 
than this one sentence, "Two Dogmas" pays little attention to the revisablity of logic. This 
one sentence has, however, generated an enormous amount of literature. For a fuller 
treatment by Quine, 8"Philosophy of Logic (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1970), 
chap. 6. Important discussions can be found in Hilary Putnam, "The Logic of Quantum 
Mechanics," Mathematics, Matter, and Method: Philosophical Papers, Vol. 1(Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1975), 174-97; Michael Dummett, "Is Logic Empirical?" Truth 
and Other Enigmas (London: Duckworth, 1978), 269-89; and David Bostock, "Logic and 
Empiricism," Mind 99:4 (October 1990): 571-82. 
  
 
 
revision. 11 
 
Given that it is logically possible that any statement may be revised, there is 
no statement true in all possible worlds, no statement whose denial is self- 
contradictory. All claims, including those of metaphysics, are on a par with 
the claims of natural science. 12 Logical necessity, strictly speaking, is 
eliminated. 
Quine's view has been criticized on the grounds that one cannot do 
away with logically necessary principles, because the very process of revision 
requires them. To judge, for example, that one's predictions have failed, one 
must be able to recognize the contradiction between one's prediction (p) and 
the recalcitrant experience (not-p).13 And to assess which statements the 
revision of which will accommodate the recalcitrant experiences, and which 
revision will produce the least changes to one's system, one must employ the 
principle of modus ponens. The very practice of inquiry thus requires logical 
principles which operate on a level above that of the claims being revised. 
Some critics have pointed out that Quine's own discussion of revision appeals 
to such logical principles, for example, when Quine writes that the "re- 
evaluation of some statements entails re-evaluation of others" and "having re- 
evaluated one statement we must re-evaluate some others, because of their 
logical connections."14  As James F. Harris writes: 
 
Clearly, there must be some rules on the meta- 
linguistic level for revising particular statements on the basis 
of other statements. Otherwise, the process of re-evaluation, 
 
 
 
 
11 Quine, "Two Dogmas," 43. 
12  Quine, "Two Dogmas," 20, 45. 
13 As Quine admits, "When a set of beliefs have accumulated to the point of contradiction . . . 
we can be sure that we are going to have to drop one of the beliefs in that subset, whatever 
else we do." W. V. Quine and J. S. Ullian, Webof Belief (New York: Random House, 1970), 
10. 
14 Quine, "Two Dogmas," 42; quoted in James F. Harris, Against Relativism: A Philosophical 
Defense of Mthod (LaSalle, IL: Open Court, 1992), 34; emphasis added by Harris. These 
same quotes bother DavidRynin in "The Dogma of Logical Pragmatism," Mind 55:259 (July 
1956), 386. My treatment of Quine owes a great deal to Harris and I do not mean to suggest 
that he (or Rynin) stops with this one criticism. 
  
 
 
the whole process of the assessment of the field, becomes a 
random process, and surely this cannot be what Quine 
intends since then there would be no way for a person to 
conduct the assessment with the  pragmatic intention of 
causing minimal disruption to the network. 15 
 
Quine can, however, respond to this criticism. In arguing that all 
members of the field of knowledge are revisable, Quine does not reject logical 
principles but merely treats them as "further elements of the field."16 In order 
to revise one's beliefs, such principles as non-contradiction and modus ponens 
may indeed be necessary, but this does not rule out the possibility that on 
another occasion the principles themselves might be amended. Quine permits 
the idea of necessity relative to context, what might be called "provisional" or 
"contextual" necessity, in distinction from absolute necessity. In order to 
revise any belief, there is always a background of assumptions that are not 
questioned-and not questionable-for the purposes of that revision. 
"Relativity to the context or circumstances of the moment-this is for me the 
keynote."17 In fact, logical principles may be so useful that one never chooses 
to revise them, but Quine's point is that this does not justify treating them as 
different in kind: "Once we abstract from the passing concerns of the moment, 
I can recognize only gradations of obviousness, gradations of consensus, 
gradations of platitude, rather than any intelligible demarcation between the 
necessary and the contingent." 18 
The more trenchant question for Quine's position is not how any 
claim could be revised without appealing to logically necessary principles, but 
specifically how those principles themselves could be revised without at the 
same time appealing to them. As Quine admits in the quotes above, revision 
requires at least the principles of non-contradiction and modus ponens. In 
order to revise one's beliefs, then, one presumably reasons in this way: this 
recalcitrant experience contradicts some part of my system; and if I revise this, 
 
 
 
 
15 Harris, Against Relativism, 37. 
16  Quine, "Two Dogmas," 42. 
17   Quine,  "Reply to Bohnert," in Lewis Edwin Hahn  and Paul Arthur  Schilpp, eds.,   The 
Philosophy of W. V. Quine (LaSalle, IL: Open Court Press,  1986), 93. 
18  Quine, "Reply to Bohnert," 94. 
  
 
 
then I must revise that. This train of reasoning eventually leads one toward 
the center of one's system of beliefs, where one concludes that, if statement p 
is true, then the statement of modus ponens must be revised. But how can one 
argue that, if p, then q, where q is the denial of "if p, then q"? If the reasoning 
is true, it is false. The same holds for the principle of non-contradiction: it 
seems impossible to reason, either p or not-p, where not-p is the denial of 
"either p or not-p." And even if one could employ a principle while revising 
it, creating, for example, a revised version of the principle of modus ponens, 
then the original principle would still be active. It would not really be revised 
but would be held, so to speak, above the revision, immune. A change of logic 
is a change of subject. Hence some of the elements of the field have the 
peculiar character that they must be held valid for any reasoning to take place, 
including reasoning about their own character. They are, in a word, 
necessary. Call this, the unrevisablity of (at least some) logical principles, the 
first problem for this strategy. 
A second and related inconsistency arises whenever one produces a 
statement that summarizes what it is that a complete naturalism stands for. 
That is, any statement like "no statement is immune from revision" also seems 
to be logically necessary. It appears to be precisely a second-order rule about 
the character of all possible statements, and therefore beyond the reach of 
experience, however recalcitrant. This is surely not how Quine intends it, 
however, for if it were necessary it would be equivalent to the statement "it is 
logically necessary that no claims are logically necessary," a clear example of 
self-referential incoherence. 19 Instead, it seems that Quine must treat this 
statement as an inductive generalization, one that may come to be revised in 
the long term. But it remains a peculiar claim, for, unlike other examples of 
falsifiable analytic claims such as "all swans are white" or "all lemons are 
fruit," Quine's claim concerns all claims and therefore includes itself. This 
self-referentiality is what generates all the inconsistencies, whether or not the 
claim actually gets revised.   On the one hand, if the statement that "no 
 
 
 
19 Maurice Mandelbaum bas called this 1he "self-excepting fallacy," that is, the fallacy of stating 
a generalization that purports to bold of all cases but which, inconsistently, is not applied to 
one's own.. See Mandelbaum, "Some Instances of the Self-Excepting Fallacy," 
Psychologische Beitrage 6 (1962): 383-86, and "Subjective, Objective, and Conceptual 
Relativisms," in Michael Krausz and Jack W. Meiland, eds., Relativism: Cognitive and 
Moral (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame,  1982), 36. 
  
 
 
statement is immune from revision" is eventually revised, then it will be the 
case that "at least one statement is immune from revision," and Quine's 
program will have been disproved. On the other hand, if the claim is not or 
not yet revised, one cannot accept Quine's program "in the meantime," as a 
sort of working hypothesis, because of its self-referential character. Consider 
the following. It is a condition of revising Quine's claim that one find a true 
claim that is logically necessary. But if one discovers such a claim, then 
Quine's claim is not only false, it is necessarily false. It has been false all along 
and could never have been true. Precisely because it is a claim about all 
claims it puts itself in the position of being either logically necessary or 
logically impossible, which is to say that it is itself a putatively necessary 
claim. But since it is a necessary claim that denies the possibility of necessary 
claims, it is self-referentially inconsistent. 
To argue that all claims are contingent, then, is self-refuting. Perhaps, 
however, Quine does not intend to argue for an anti-metaphysical position but 
simply to make the observation that apparently necessary claims have been 
revised in the past and so a sense of history (and of humility) leads one not to 
claim any absoluteness or finality for what appears necessary now. Hilary 
Putnam interprets Quine in this manner, calling Quine's argument "an 
induction from the history of science" and chiding those who argue that 
Quine's position is self-refuting for taking a "cheap shot."20 According to 
Putnam, Quine makes an observation of historic importance for philosophy: 
that the distinction between contingent and necessary statements is better 
understood as a distinction between those statements that can be revised in 
light of experience alone and those whose revision waits on the emergence of 
a rival theory. 
While this distinction is certainly legitimate, its use in an argument 
against the possibility of necessary statements trades on an ambiguity in the 
term "revisable." To say that a claim is "revisable" may refer either to its 
epistemic character (that the claim is made fallibly, and the one who asserts 
it may be wrong) or to its logical character (that the claim is contingent, and 
that about which it is asserted may be otherwise).  Neither interpretation of 
 
 
 
2° For what Putnam calls Quine's historical argument, see "Two Dogmas' Revisited," 90-92; 
for the reference to the a priori cheap shot, see "There Is at Least One A Priori Truth,'' 
Realism and Reason, 98. 
  
 
 
the historical argument will do the work Quine needs. In the first case, to 
recognize that a claim is fallible has no bearing on its logical character. For 
this reason, even a complete fallibilism does not refute the possibility of 
necessary claims: one can fallibly hold that something is true some of the time 
or one can fallibly hold that it is true come what may.21 As Aron Edidin says, 
"A priori justification must be independent of empirical evidence, but it seems 
perverse to require that it also be independent of non-empirical evidence, for 
example, that of deduction, logical intuition, or thought experiment."22 In the 
second case, if Quine means to show that all claims are logically contingent, 
then his historical evidence does not address the point. That a claim about 
matter in Newton's system or about space in pre-Lobachevskiian geometry 
turns out with the emergence of a superior theory to be necessary only given 
the axioms of an obsolete system does not prove that logically necessary 
claims are impossible, but only that these particular claims were incorrectly 
classified. They were not absolutely necessary, but only conditionally 
necessary. With the emergence of the alternative theory, their correct status 
is recognized. (Moreover, they do not become contingent claims but remain 
necessary claims, of a conditional sort.) In short, if one wants to argue that 
there are no absolutely necessary claims, claims that hold true under any set 
of axioms, it is not appropriate to point out that there have been some claims 
that did not make the grade. Historical observations and inductive arguments 
are simply not appropriate to conclusions about every possible claim. Unless 
the statement that no claims are logically necessary is argued as itself logically 
necessary, no amount of empirical evidence can prove it, but to argue for it as 
a necessary claim is self-contradictory. Hence the second problem generated 
by this strategy is to state one's position without incurring this self-referential 
inconsistency. 
 
 
II. 
 
 
 
 
21 For a textbook treatment of this point, see Raymond Bradley and Norman Swartz, Possible 
Worlds: An Introduction to Philosophy and its Logic (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1979), 155- 
56. 
22  Aron Edidin, "A Priori Knowledge for Fallibilists," Philosophical Studies 46:2 (September 
1984), 189. 
  
 
 
The first strategy for an anti-metaphysical position stumbles on its need to 
prove that logic and its own basic principles are contingent. The second 
strategy avoids these problems by distinguishing between the logical necessity 
of propositions and the ontological necessity of things. Inthis way it seeks to 
affirm the possibility of some logically necessary statements while still 
denying the possibility of any logically necessary existential statements. The 
existence of anything is on this account logically contingent. 
John Hick has developed a position of this type which defends the 
intelligibility of both logical and ontological necessity. 23 By logical necessity, 
Hick means the predication of the property of necessity of a proposition, for 
example, "It is logically necessary that p," or, simply, "Necessarily, p." 
Logical necessity designates for Hick a linguistic or conceptual affair: "To say 
that a given proposition is logically true, or logically necessary, or analytic, is 
generally intended to signify that it is true by virtue of the meanings of the 
terms which compose it."24 Hence by logical necessity Hick means to permit 
both formal logical truths (such as "for any statement, either p or not-p"), and 
analytic statements (such as "blue is a color"). By ontological necessity, on 
the other hand, Hick means the predication of the property of necessary 
existence of an entity. To say that something has necessary existence is to say 
that its existence depends on no conditions or factors other than itself. An 
ontologically necessary being would therefore be eternal, incorruptible, and 
 
 
 
 
23 Hick works out this distinction in three repetitive articles: "God as Necessary Being," Journal 
of Philosophy 57:22-3 (Oct 27 - Nov 10, 1960), 725-34; "Necessary Being," Scottish 
Journal of Theology 14:4 (1961): 353-69; and "A Critique of the 'Second Argument,"' in 
John Hick and Arthur C. McGill, eds., The Many-Faced Argument: Recent Studies on the 
Ontological Argument for the Existence of God (New York: The Macmillan company, 
1967), 341-56. Another position of this type (excluded from this essay for reasons of 
space) also distinguishes between logical and ontological necessity but argues that the latter 
is senseless, that the only mode of necessity there can be is logical necessity. For this 
argument, see Quine, "Reference and Modality," From a Logical Point of View, 139-59. 
For a powerful critique of Quine's position from the perspective of neoclassical 
metaphysics, see George L. Goodwin, The Ontological Argument of Charles Hartshorne 
(Missoula, MN: Scholars Press, 1978), chap. N, and "'De Re' Modality and the 
Ontological Argument," in Marco M. Olivetti, ed, L'Argomento Ontologico (Pava: 
CELAM, 1990); for an equally powerful critique from the perspective of possible world 
semantics, see Alvin Plantinga, The Nature a/ Necessity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), 
222-51. 
24   Hick, "A Critique of the 'Second Argument,"' 341. 
  
 
 
Indestructible.25    Such a being would exist "without beginning or end, and 
without origin, cause, or ground of any kind whatsoever. "26 
According to Hick, one can admit the intelligibility of both logical and 
ontological necessity and, as long as one keeps them apart, neither will imply 
a logically necessary existential proposition. That is, Hick denies that either 
logically necessary statements or statements about ontological necessity lead 
to metaphysics. Why not? In  the first case, a logically necessary statement 
can never describe what exists because the word "exists" is not properly a 
descriptive term. Hick contends that it has been made clear by Kant, and later 
reinforced by Russell's theory of descriptions, that it is mistaken to think of 
"existence" as a quality or attribute. "Existence is not a predicate comparable 
with, say, 'red' or 'four-footed' as qualities which a given entity might have or 
lack. To affirm that x exists is not to say that x has, among its several 
properties, that of existence; it is to perform the quite different operation of 
asserting that the concept of x is instantiated." 27 In short, since existence is 
not a property, it cannot be a logically necessary property. Consequently, one 
cannot sensibly say that "it is logically necessary that p" when p is an 
existential claim. To say that something exists is simply shorthand for saying 
that there is something that answers the description of x. There cannot be a 
logically necessary entity, for logical necessity has no purchase on matters of 
fact and existence. 
Likewise, statements about ontological necessity, even if they are 
true, are not metaphysical. Ontological necessity is intelligible, Hick grants, 
because one can make sense of the idea that an entity exists under all 
conditions-"always and everywhere." In fact, one might simply define a 
concept as the concept of an eternal, indestructible, and incorruptible entity. 
Ontological necessity can be a property, just as ontological contingency is. 
But Hick argues that ontologically necessary existence does not imply 
logically necessary existence. If it did, such an entity would exist in every 
logically possible world, including the actual world.  But Hick argues that 
 
 
 
25  Hick, "God as Necessary Being," 732. 
26   Ibid., 733. 
27 Hick,An Interpretation of Religion: Human Responses to the Transcendent (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1989), 75;for a fuller treatment of Kant's critical contribution to Hick's 
position, see Hick, "Ontological Argument for the Existence of God," in Paul Edwards, ed., 
Encyclopedia  of Philosophy 5 (New York: Macmillan and The Free Press, 1967), 539-40. 
  
 
 
even if there exists an ontologically necessary being, it might not have 
existed; it is logically possible that it not exist. There is therefore a gap 
between ontology and logic. As Hick puts it, even if one defines a concept 
as that of "an ontologically necessary entity," the question "whether that 
concept is instantiated still cannot be determined by the concept itself but 
only by the facts of the universe." 28 From the fact that a being exists 
necessarily, it does not follow that it necessarily exists.  It only follows that if 
such a being exists, it will exist eternally, independently, without a cause, and 
so forth. Thus Hick not only distinguishes but also separates an entity's 
logical status from its real status. Neither implies the other, and so, no 
matter how something exists, it is always logically possible that it did not.29 
This separation of logic and ontology permits Hick to avoid both of 
the problems into which Quine's strategy fell. First, one need not claim that 
logical principles are contingent, for logically necessary claims are permitted. 
Second, one also avoids the self-referential problem into which Quine's first 
position fell, for one can state and defend one's position as a logically 
necessary, non-existential claim. That is, one can state and defend one's 
position by interpreting the statement that it is logically contingent that 
anything exists as a statement not about entities but about statements, for 
example, as "Any statement of the form 'x exists' is logically contingent." 
Because this statement is not existential, it can be defended as logically 
necessary without incurring self-referential inconsistency. 
Now, the alternative to Hick's position would be one in which logic 
and ontology do imply each other. On such an account, those states of affairs 
that are ontologically contingent correspond to logical possibilities; those that 
are ontologically necessary correspond to logical necessities. It does not make 
sense on such an account to say that an ontological possibility will necessarily 
be, nor that a state of affairs that is ontologically necessary might not be. 
 
 
 
28 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, 75. For Hick, the relevant facts may not be apparent 
while one is still in the universe. See Hick, "Theology and Verification," Theology Today 
17:1(April   1960): 12-31. 
29 The separation of logic and ontology has appealed to some radical empiricists as well. See 
Jerome A Stone, The Minimalist Vision of Transcendence: A Naturalist Philosophy of 
Religion (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 170-78, and perhaps also 
Nancy Frankenberry, Religion and Radical Empiricism (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 1987), 22-23. 
   
 
Such is the position of Charles Hartshorne, who argues that logic and the 
meanings of terms grow out of an involvement with the real world and that 
therefore, although logic and ontology can be distinguished, these are not 
separable.30 Hartshorne's position has been argued for by Larry Goodwin, 
upon whose clarity I cannot improve. 
 
To say that a concept is logically possible ... is simply to say 
that the meanings involved in the concept do not contradict 
each other. But meanings have reference. ... In other 
words, the non-contradictory meanings involved in 
genuinely logical possibilities must themselves refer at least 
to possibilities. What sort of possibilities? Obviously, at 
some point, to real possibilities; for if the meanings involved 
in logical possibility A refer to logical possibility B, [and so 
on]. ..we have an infinite regress. At some point the 
meanings involved in a logical possibility must refer to a 
real possibility. In short, compatibility with actuality... is 
not only the definition of real ...potentiality, it is also the 
criterion for logical conceivability, because a consistent 
thought cannot refer only to its own consistency. 31 
 
One can call this position one of modal coincidence, Hick's one of modal 
separation. 
One clear point of conflict between these two theories of modality is 
whether an ontologically necessary being would also be logically necessary. 
If logical and ontological modalities imply each other, as Hartshorne has it, 
the statement that an ontologically necessary being exists would have to 
be logically necessary.  Hick is clearly opposed to this: "These two concepts 
are 
 
 
 
30 See especially, Charles Hartshorne, "Real Possibility," Journal of Philosophy 60 (October 
1963):   593-605. 
31 Goodwin, The Ontological Argument of Charles Hartshorne, 41-42. In a similar vein, 
David Haight has charged that logic separated from reality is "empty'' and "rootless." 
Regarding the logically necessary statement that "Whatever is blue is colored," he asks, "Is 
it not the case that logical necessity is grounded in ontological necessity by virtue of the fact 
that, e.g., blue is in fact ... a color?" David Haight, "Is Existence an Essential Predicate?" 
Idealistic Studies 7:2 (May 1977), 194. 
  
 
 
quite distinct; logical necessity is not a case of ontological necessity, nor vice 
versa. "32 On Hick's position, it is logically possible that an ontologically 
necessary being does not exist, and so, even if such a being exists, this fact is 
logically contingent. How can one decide between these two positions? Hick 
appeals to conceivability. "Post-Humean empiricism can assign no meaning 
to the idea of [logically] necessary existence, since nothing can be conceived 
to exist that cannot also be conceived not to exist."33 That is, it seems that one 
can always conceive the nonexistence of an ontologically necessary being, 
because as a matter of fact one can conceive the non-existence of anything in 
general. This then is a second (and nontheistic) point of conflict between 
these two theories: one asserts and the other denies that it makes sense to say 
that anything might not exist. 
Both the claim about conceiving the nonexistence of an ontologically 
necessary being and the claim about conceiving nonexistence in general, 
however, lead to difficulties, if not paradoxes. 34 Consider the first, that one 
can conceive the nonexistence of a being that can exist under any conditions. 
What would such a conception be like? Any conceivable experience is by 
definition one with which such a being is compatible! And even if one claims 
to be able to conceive this non-existence, it seems that it would be impossible 
to explain it. The problem is this: if someone asks Hick why a logically 
necessary statement is true, he can respond, "because it could not be 
otherwise." But by treating the existence of an ontologically necessary being 
as logically contingent, Hick closes the door on this kind of explanation; it 
could be otherwise. But because the existence of this being is ontologically 
necessary, Hick also rules out the possibility of a causal, naturalistic 
explanation. If  such a being exists, it exists of its own power, necessarily, 
independently, indestructibly. But what then could keep it from existing?  It 
is contingent upon nothing, yet it still is contingent. Hick correctly says that 
the existence of an ontologically necessary being is on his account a brute fact, 
sheer datum, but this is not an explanation; it is the lack of an explanation. 
 
 
 
 
32  Hick, "A Critique of the 'Second Argument,"' 348. 
33 Hick, "God as Necessary Being," 727. 
34 For an excellent treatment of the possibilities of conceiving nonexistence, see Robert 
Merrihew Adams, "Has It Been Proved That All Real Existence is Contingent?" American 
Philosophical Quarterly 8:3 (July 1971): 284-91. 
  
 
 
As Hartshorne has said, such a being considered under Hick's modal 
separation is an absolutely irrational fact, indistinguishable from a reductio of 
itself .35 
Turn now to the claim that one can conceive the nonexistence of any 
entity, that the denial of existence is logically possible in every case. Hick 
denies that it is logically necessary that something exists. But to deny the 
logical necessity of such a statement commits one to the claim that it is 
logically possible that nothing exists, and this is a peculiar claim. It is not 
simply the claim that there are relative lacks or absences or privations but 
rather an appeal to the intelligibility of the idea of absolute nothingness. If 
Hick is correct, it must be conceivable that absolutely nothing exists. What 
would it mean to say this? As with the above case, no conceivable experience 
could verify this claim, and any conceivable experience falsifies it. Moreover, 
confronted as one is with a world full of things, this claim is one whose 
meaningfulness makes no practical difference for human action, and cannot 
conceivably make such a difference. Hence this second strategy for a complete 
naturalism requires that one grant the meaningfulness of a statement with 
neither empirical nor pragmatic value.36 
I have argued above that Hick connects words in a logical order 
without relation to any conceivable states of affairs. This is a consequence (if 
not the very definition) of the separation of logic and ontology. One can now 
see the cost of defending one's naturalism in this way. The claim that all 
things exist contingently implies or is equivalent to the claim that it is logically 
possible that nothing exist. Yet surely it is a condition of a meaningful claim 
that one can conceive of some criteria by which the claim might be validated, 
 
 
 
35 Hartshorne, "Is the Denial of Existence Ever Contradictory?" Journal of Philosophy 58:4 
(February 17, 1966), 89. For further arguments that ontological necessity implies logical 
necessity, see Alan G. Nasser, "Factual and Logical Necessity and the Ontological 
Argument," International Philosophical Quarterly 11:3 (September 1971): 385-402, and 
John D. White, "God and Necessity," International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 10:3 
(1979):  177-87. 
36 As Hartshorne has jibed, the possibility of nothing is no more a possibility than having 
nothing to eat is a kind of meal. Hartshorne, Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method 
(Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1970), 245; see also "Non-restrictive Existential 
Statements," 159-72. For a classical analysis of the idea of nothing, one in accord with an 
empirical and pragmatic understanding of meaning, see Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, 
translated by Arthur Mitchell (New York: The Modem Library, 1944), 296-324. 
  
 
 
and this claim about pure nothingness fails. 
 
III. 
 
Given the question "Does the world include any necessary features?" the first 
two strategies try to argue that it does not. One can call these two strategies 
attempts to deny metaphysics. I have argued that both strategies generate 
contradictions. Another response to the metaphysical question is possible if 
one can simply tum away from the question, leaving it unanswered as useless, 
uninteresting, or pernicious. One can call this a refusal of metaphysics. 
Richard Rorty's is the most influential attempt to develop a strategy that does 
not argue against but simply abandons metaphysics. 
Rorty agrees with Quine that there are no absolutely necessary 
claims: "a necessary truth is just a statement such that nobody has given us 
any interesting alternatives which would lead us to question it."37 Rorty's 
position differs from Quine's, and from Hick's, however, in that he does not try 
to argue that there are or could be no necessary claims. Rorty considers the 
history of arguments over whether there are or are not necessary claims a 
stalemate. "I do not know what would count as a noncircular metaphysical or 
epistemological or semantical argument for seeing them in either way."38 
Rorty's goal is to suggest that the very idea of necessary truths is not a useful 
one and is better laid aside. Although this strategy is sometimes considered 
irrationalist or not really philosophical, it is best seen, in my opinion, as a 
legitimate attempt to reject not only his opponents' claims, but also their 
presuppositions. 
According to Rorty, the belief that one needs necessary truths follows 
from the presupposition that true ideas or true sentences are those that 
successfully "represent" or "picture" reality. Given this presupposition, it 
makes sense to ask whether one's propositions really do correspond to what 
there is and it makes sense to search for proof that they do.  Proof would be 
 
 
 
37 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1979), 175. Rorty labels himself a naturalist, defining naturalism "as the view that 
anything might have been otherwise." Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,  1991), 55, emphasis in original. 
38  Rorty,   "Pragmatism,  Relativism,   and  Irrationalism,"   Consequences  of  Pragmatism 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,  1982), 174, emphasis added. 
  
 
 
a proposition that must be true, that cannot be denied, a necessary truth. 
But the idea that one can compare one's propositions to 
nonpropositional reality is a strange one, Rorty argues, and no one has yet 
been able to show how it could be done. The problem is this.  In order to 
show that a proposition is true, one needs to identify the nonpropositional 
"stuff ' which makes it true. But as soon as one describes this stuff-whether 
as "experience," or "sensory stimuli," or what have you-it is no longer 
nonpropositional stuff. Any appeal to "the world" is circular because all 
descriptions are embedded in the language of some particular set of 
circumstances. "[N]othing counts as justification unless by reference to what 
we already accept, and ... there is no way to get outside our beliefs and our 
language so as to find some other test than coherence."39 One can now 
appreciate why Rorty believes that the history of metaphysical and anti- 
metaphysical arguments issues in a stalemate. Resolution of this debate seems 
to require that someone find some nonlinguistic place from which to test the 
adequacy of one's linguistic claims. Representationalism thus involves the 
urge to escape history and language in order to assume a "God's eye view" or 
a "view from nowhere," untainted by the contingencies of language and social 
convention. Rorty suggests that it is implausible to believe that a non-causal 
link between beliefs and non-beliefs is forthcoming. There is no test that can 
tell us whether representations are accurate, other than the success which is 
supposedly explained by that accuracy. 
But if the world does not make beliefs true, what does? Rorty's 
answer is, "nothing." Beliefs are not "made true." It is precisely this question 
that Rorty wants philosophers to drop. Rorty proposes that on the subject of 
truth philosophers rest content with a true proposition's utility and leave the 
question of what makes it useful as an empty one. "True" does not stand for 
anything, and so one need not try to define or explain it.40   Rorty proposes that 
 
 
 
 
39  Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, 178. 
40 In one typically incisive passage, Rorty argues that "it would be a mistake to think of 'true' 
as having an explanatory use on the basis of such examples as 'He found the correct house 
because his belief about its location was true' and 'Priestley failed to understand the nature of 
oxygen because his beliefs about the nature of combustion were false.' The quoted sentences 
are not explanations but promissory notes for explanations. To get them cashed, to get real 
explanations, we need to say things like 'He found the correct house because he believed that 
it was located at...' and 'Priestley failed because he thought that phlogiston ...' The explanation 
  
 
 
one simply drop the idea that propositions mirror the world-what Dewey 
called "the spectator theory of knowledge"-and consider them instead as 
tools developed to work upon the world. "It is the vocabulary of practise 
rather than of theory, of action rather than contemplation, in which one can 
say something useful about truth."41 This pragmatism is itself not a proposal 
for a new, pragmatic answer to the question of truth, but the dissolution of the 
question. "[I]t is simply anti-essentialism applied to notions like 'truth,' 
'knowledge,' 'language,' 'morality' and similar objects of philosophical 
theorizing.”42 What Rorty proposes is philosophy as a therapeutic, 
nonsysternatic, edifying conversation, not as the inquiry into truths which lie 
"beyond" or "above" all other disciplines. Such a strategy might be 
distinguished from Quine's and Hick's by saying that, whereas the first two 
strategies were anti-metaphysical, Rorty's is simply non-metaphysical. It 
simply drops the question. 
How does Rorty justify his pragmatism?  To give a positive account 
of what makes his position true would clearly play into the metaphysician's 
hands, and Rorty is very conscious of the self-referential traps involved in 
trying to overcome what he has called the representationalist tradition.  Rorty 
concludes that there is no way to argue for a non-metaphysical philosophy, 
except by replying to its critics.43   What one can do is make ad hoc criticisms 
of necessary claims as they arise, limit oneself to negative points, and refuse 
the attempt to explain or theorize one's position.44   In this, one emulates the 
later Wittgenstein who, "at his best, just makes fun of the whole idea that 
there is something here to be explained" and the later Heidegger who offers 
 
 
 
of success and failure is given by the details about what was true or what was false, not by 
the truth or falsity itself.... If truth itself is to be an explanation of something, that 
explanandum must be of something which can be caused by truth, but not caused by the 
content of true beliefs." Rorty, "Pragmatism, Davidson, and Truth," Objectivity, Relativism, 
and Truth, 140-41. 
41   Rorty, "Pragmatism, Relativism, and Irrationalism,"  162. 
42  Ibid. 
43 Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, 181. See also Contingency, Irony and 
Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 44, 78, for an explanation of 
why "'argument” is not the right word" for Rorty's method. 
44 On purely negative points, see Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, xx, and "Solidarity or 
Objectivity?" Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth, 23-24. For explanation refusal see 
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, 176, 180. 
  
 
 
only an "endless, repetitive, literary-historical 'deconstruction' of the 
'metaphysics of presence'." 45 If others persist in asking constructive, 
metaphysical questions such as "are there necessary features of the world?" 
one ought simply to "change the subject."46 
Rorty's ironic gestures should not give the impression that he refuses 
to justify his position, but only that he refuses to be drawn into justification 
by correspondence. For Rorty, the unit of persuasion is the vocabulary and 
the justification of a vocabulary turns on its utility, on whether it helps one do 
what one is interested in doing. "The question whether the pragmatist view 
of truth-that it is not a profitable topic-is itself true is thus a question about 
whether a post-Philosophical culture is a good thing to try for."47 One might 
object that Rorty's justification of pragmatism is circular, that he proposes that 
one adopt the vocabulary of pragmatism because it will be pragmatic. But 
Rorty's point is this: if there are no necessary claims to serve as transcendental 
standards for the choice of vocabularies as a whole, then all justification is 
circular. Neither the pragmatist nor the metaphysician can justify their 
position without circularity.48 
I believe that, like the attempts to deny metaphysics, this attempt to 
abandon or circumvent it is not successful. To show why, let me focus on 
Rorty's claim that, when one drops the idea of representationalism, the urge 
to find necessary truths falls with it. Rorty considers representationalism and 
necessity linked because he treats necessity as "that special sort of certainty 
associated with visual perception.”49 "The idea of 'necessary truth' is just the 
idea of a proposition which is believed because the 'grip' of the object on us 
is ineluctable.”50 Rorty then argues that, if one ceases to think of justification 
as the accurate relation of beliefs to objects and thinks of it rather as the 
coherent relation of beliefs to each other, then distinctions such as that 
between necessarily-existing objects and contingently-existing objects lose 
their force. In their place one has the Quinean distinction between those 
beliefs with which one is willing to part, and those with which, for the sake 
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46  Ibid, xiv. 
41  Ibid, vliii. 
48 Rorty, "Solidarity or Objectivity?" 28-29. 
49  Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, 181. 
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of present purposes at least, one is not. Representationalism was the 
problematic that generated skepticism, and thereby generated a need for 
necessary truths. When one abandons it, one also should lose the feeling that 
one needs more than every day, "retail," contingent truths. 
But do all necessary claims depend on representationalism, or can 
there be pragmatic necessary claims? Imagine the following thought 
experiment. Rorty proposes that philosophers abandon the vocabulary of 
contemplation and objects, where the problems of representationalism arose, 
infavor of the vocabulary of practice and action, where they would not. Let 
us say that metaphysically minded philosophers agree to this. They agree, that 
is, that no appeals to prelinguistic awareness, intuitions, or inner 
representations can be used to justify knowledge and that justification must 
always be between propositions. Let us say that they agree also that all 
theoretical judgments are implicitly judgments of value, and that all reflection 
is conditioned by the social and linguistic context in which it occurs. In short, 
they abandon representationalism and embrace pragmatism (at least to this 
extent). What follows? It still seems natural and legitimate that one of the 
questions in which these philosophers will be interested will be whether any 
of their socially and linguistically mediated beliefs cannot be consistently 
denied.  Granting that all of their beliefs arise in a particular context and for 
a particular purpose, the question remains whether any of them successfully 
transcend their origins, however tentatively and fallibly, to describe necessary 
features of reality. 51 In other words, there seems no reason why 
transcendental philosophy cannot make the "pragmatic tum," and seek the 
necessary conditions of human understanding in purposeful, social agency 
just as it earlier had sought them in the make-up of the solitary knowing 
subject. 2 
 
 
 
 
 
51 In fact, one might take James's dictum that "the vocabulary of practice is ineliminable" 
(quoted by Rorty, "Pragmatism, Relativism, and Irrationalism," 163) as itself a necessary 
claim about the character or conditions of meaning. 
52 Two major proposals for such a shift are those of Karl-Otto Apel and Charles Taylor. For 
programmatic statements, see Apel, "The Transformation of Transcendental Philosophy," in 
Understanding an Explanation: A Transcendental-Pragmatic Perspective, translated by 
Georgia Warnke (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984), 232-42; and Taylor, "The Validity 
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Of course, Rorty may protest that the shift to pragmatism does not 
discover anything positive about the nature of social practice, "that it is more 
prevalent than had previously been thought."13 He may believe that human 
actions have no transcendental features. But it is not clear what reasons he 
can give. As I hope to have showed, anti-representationalism by itself is not 
a reason to abandon metaphysics, and Rorty identifies his pragmatism with 
anti-representationalism. 54 
A transcendental pragmatism like the one I am here outlining would 
seek to describe the character or conditions of human subjectivity as such. 
Otherwise put, it would seek to identify logically necessary claims about 
human subjectivity. To be sure, this task is not the same as that of a 
transcendental metaphysics which seeks to describe the character or 
conditions of reality as such, but the former would include the latter, for the 
simple reason that human subjects are part of reality, and so some of the 
conditions of being a human subject are the conditions of being anything at 
all. This relationship is often denied (for example, by Kant) on the grounds 
that transcendental reflection may uncover the conditions for the possibility 
of phenomena or things insofar as they appear, but it cannot reveal the 
character of things in themselves. This objection, however, assumes 
representationalism; it assumes, that is, the intelligibility of the idea of a 
reality that is outside the mind and can never be known. But transcendental 
arguments, I have argued, can make the pragmatic turn and drop this 
assumption. Precisely because representationalism is incredible and there can 
be no access to the world as it is in itself, one cannot restrict necessary claims 
to claims about human subjectivity. A transcendental claim about the world 
really is about the world. If this argument is sound, genuine metaphysical 
inquiry   is   actually   made   possible   by   the   pragmatic   critique   of 
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representationalism. 55 
In order to clarify my differences from Rorty, one can distinguish 
between those necessary claims that are dependent upon representationalism 
and those that are independent of it. In the first case, there are claims that are 
alleged to be necessary in the sense that they describe immediate, and 
therefore epistemically certain, sensory knowledge. Such claims are typically 
empirical claims about a particular experience or aspect of an experience upon 
which one can base or legitimize more complex empirical knowledge. It is 
this kind of foundationalist claim that Rorty's critique of representationalism 
excludes. In the second case, there are claims that are alleged to be necessary 
in an altogether different sense, namely, that they describe the formal or 
generic features of all things. Such metaphysical claims cannot be used to 
legitimize empirical claims, nor can empirical claims be derived from them. 
Examples of such claims include Aristotle's suggestion that all things are 
composed of substances or Whitehead's that all things are composed of events. 
On the view outlined here, these metaphysical claims are not subject to Rorty's 
criticisms as long as one recognizes that metaphysical claims, like all claims, 
are linguistically mediated and epistemically fallible. Although Rorty 
collapses what I am here calling foundationalism and metaphysics, and he 
writes as if representationalism is equally the condition for metaphysics, 56 it 
is difficult to see how the critique of representationalism could be relevant to 
it. 
One last point. The idea that one can simply abandon metaphysics 
seems confused. One can abandon metaphysics without inconsistency only 
if one can find an alternative form of discourse that does not imply any 
metaphysical features. But if one recognizes metaphysics as a discipline that 
reveals "the traits and characters that are sure to turn up in every universe of 
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discourse," 57 then one cannot consistently refuse metaphysics unless one 
(secretly) denies that metaphysics is possible. In other words, for Rorty to 
insist to those who share his pragmatic presuppositions that one can change 
the subject or simply refuse to answer the question whether there are 
metaphysical characteristics is in effect to assert that there are none. For, if 
there are any such characteristics, all human discourse will imply them. 
Hence it seems that there is no difference in principle between being non- 
metaphysical and being anti-metaphysical, between denying that there are 
necessary statements and refusing to answer the question whether there are 
any. Those who seek to avoid metaphysics can do so only by arguing with 
Quine or with Hick, two strategies with serious obstacles of their own. 
The arguments of this paper have been solely negative. I have not laid 
out a positive understanding of metaphysics, nor have I shown how such an 
understanding would prove compatible with naturalism.  I hope only that the 
reader has gotten the impression that defending naturalism without 
metaphysics is a problematic task.58 
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